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ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose a secure index and data symbol modulation scheme for orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing with index modulation (OFDM-IM) systems. By exploiting the notion of
the channel reciprocity in time division duplexing mode over wireless channels for shared channel state
information as a secret key, we investigate randomized mapping rules for index modulation as well as
data symbol modulation. Due to the randomized mapping rules for index and data symbol modulation
in OFDM-IM, an eavesdropper is not able to correctly decide message bits even though active subcarriers
and their symbols are correctly estimated. In particular, we exploit a characteristic of OFDM-IM which uses
a fraction of subcarriers for transmissions to enhance security of data symbol modulation. In addition, to
design a set of mapping rules for data symbol modulation, we investigate both a random-selection-based set
and a bit-mismatch-based set. Through the analysis and simulation results, we demonstrate that the proposed
scheme based on the randomized mapping rules for index modulation and data symbol modulation has a
better performance than an existing scheme (modiﬁed for OFDM-IM) in terms of bit error rate (BER) and
successful attack probability. In particular, we can show that the BER at an eavesdropper is much higher if
the bit-mismatch-based set of mapping rules is used.
INDEX TERMS Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing, index modulation, data symbol modulation,
physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Index modulation (IM) is an emerging key technique for
5th generation (5G) wireless networks because of its high
spectral and energy efﬁciency [1]. There are two well-known
applications of IM. One is spatial modulation (SM) [2]
and the other is orthogonal frequency division multiplex-
ing (OFDM)-IM. Especially, OFDM-IM has been intensively
studied in [1], [3]–[11]. Unlike conventional OFDM [12], a
fraction of subcarriers are active, and the indices of active
subcarriers convey information bits in OFDM-IM. Due to a
high spectral efﬁciency as well as a high energy efﬁciency,
it is considered not only for high speed wireless commu-
nications systems but also for machine-type communica-
tions (MTC) such as body centric communications (BCC)
and smart grid communications [7], [13], where the energy
efﬁciency is important.
Various attractive IM-aided OFDM systems have been
studied. In [14] and [15], dual-mode (DM) OFDM-IM that
all the subcarriers divided into two groups are modulated
by a pair of distinguishable modulation constellations is
presented to achieve better performance in terms of relia-
bility. In addition, for 5G wireless networks, multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) OFDM-IM where IM concept is
combined with MIMO transmissions to take advantages of
two techniques is proposed as an alternative to classical
MIMO-OFDM in [10]. In [11], a transmit diversity scheme
for OFDM-IM is presented to obtain diversity gain with low
complexity maximum likelihood (ML) detection.
Due to the inherent broadcast nature of wireless commu-
nications, it is vulnerable to eavesdropping on conﬁdential
data transmitted to a legitimate receiver. Security techniques
in upper layers have been used for the transmission of con-
ﬁdential data [16]. However, such security techniques may
need a high computational complexity and a large overhead.
Furthermore, they may become prone to powerful computing
attacks due to emerging powerful computing devices [17].
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To overcome those problems, physical layer security has
attracted a lot of attentions [18]–[21]. It exploits the dynamic
characteristics of wireless communications such as random
channel, noise, and interferences for secure transmissions.
In [22], the process of generating a key from a wireless
channel is introduced and it is demonstrated that a wireless
channel can be used as a source of secret private keys for a
legitimate transmitter and a legitimate receiver.
For OFDM systems, physical layer security techniques
have been studied in [23]–[29]. In [23], a secrecy rate which
is a theoretical secrecy metric in physical layer security
is derived under various OFDM communication scenarios.
It is shown that the power allocation plays a crucial role in
improving the secrecy rate. To increase the secrecy rate under
an unfavorable channel scenario, a secure beamforming and
artiﬁcial noise which degrades eavesdropper’s channel are
used for secure OFDM transmissions based on the channel
state information (CSI) in [25]. However, it is necessary to
usemultiple antennas at a transmitter for secure beamforming
and artiﬁcial noise. In [28] and [29], chaotic sequences and
the CSI based interleaving are used to randomize the modu-
lated signal for secure OFDM systems. Particularly, in [29],
the CSI based interleaving scheme has been studied to prevent
an eavesdropper from correctly deciding conﬁdential infor-
mation symbols in OFDM systems. However, there exists a
trade-off between reliability and security which is determined
by the number of interleaved subcarriers in [29]. In addition,
to guarantee high security and reliability, it may require side
information transmissions between legitimate transmitter and
receiver.
There are physical layer security techniques for
SM [30]–[34]. In [30], a jamming signal is used to prevent
from eavesdropping in SM. Transmit precoding for secure
SM is introduced in [31]. In addition, information theoretical
approach for the security of SM is presented in [32] and [33].
In [34], secure IM for a SM based physical layer security is
proposed where the channel between a legitimate transmitter
and a legitimate receiver is used to randomize a mapping
rule for only IM symbols in [34]. However, although the
information bits transmitted by IM can be secure, it does not
guarantee any security for transmitted data symbols through
active subcarriers.
In this paper, we propose a secure IM and data symbol
modulation (DSM) scheme to improve the physical layer
security in OFDM-IM systems. In particular, based on the
channel reciprocity between a legitimate transmitter and a
legitimate receiver in time division duplexing (TDD) mode,
the CSI based randomized mapping rules for IM and DSM
are proposed to confuse an eavesdropper who does not have
the CSI. Unlike the conventional schemes for secure OFDM
in [29] and SM in [34] where no security for DSM bits
are considered, we also ensure secure transmissions of DSM
bits. Therefore, all information bits that are transmitted by
either IM or DSM can be secure in the proposed secure
OFDM-IM without any additional side information. It is
noteworthy that we use a characteristic of OFDM-IM that a
fraction of subcarriers is used for transmissions to enhance
the security of DSM bits. The CSI associated with active
subcarriers which are determined by IMbits is used as a secret
key in the proposed secure DSM. Then, it can dynamically
update the secret key (i.e., CSI) for the coherence time with-
out any side information, while it is necessary to send side
information to change the secret key in secure OFDM [29].
Furthermore, we design a set of mapping rules for DSM to
improve the security of DSM bits. To this end, we develop a
bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules for secure DSM and
provide the bit error rate (BER) performance analysis at an
eavesdropper. Through a theoretical analysis and numerical
simulations, we can show that the proposed set of mapping
rules is superior to a random-selection based set of mapping
rules in terms of security. In particular, we show that the
proposed secure OFDM-IM using the bit-mismatch based set
of mapping rules can result in a high BER at an eavesdropper
even if an eavesdropper’s signal to noise ratio (SNR) is high.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• The secure mapping algorithms to protect both IM and
DSM bits are proposed under the OFDM framework
for the secure OFDM-IM scheme. To the best of our
knowledge, secure DSM for OFDM-IM has not been
studied in the literature yet and only the secure IM is
studied under the SM framework.
• For the performance analysis, we derive the BER expres-
sions at a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper, which
represent the reliability and the security, respectively.
For pragmatic systems, we evaluate the impact of imper-
fect CSI on the performance. Throughout the paper, as a
security metric, we use the BER at an eavesdropper for
uncoded systems. Unfortunately, this performance met-
ric is not an information-theoretic security measure [35].
However, as in [29], [34], and [36], it might be used
as a pragmatic metric for lightweight secure transmis-
sion schemes. In particular, since OFDM-IM might be
used in applications where transmitters and receivers
have various implementation constraints in terms of
complexity (e.g., BCC in [7]), it might be desirable to
consider simple, but effective secure OFDM-IM that can
securely transmit both IM and DSM bits. Furthermore,
we derive a successful attack probability that an eaves-
dropper estimates secure mapping rules in the proposed
secure OFDM-IM. It is shown that if a characteristic of
OFDM-IM is employed for secure DSM in the proposed
secure OFDM-IM, the successful attack probability can
be much lower compared to that of secure OFDM.
• To maximize the security performance in terms of BER
at an eavesdropper, we propose the bit-mismatch based
set of mapping rules for secure DSM. Employing such
set of mapping rules for the secure OFDM-IM is shown
to ensure a high BER at the eavesdropper even at
high SNR.
• In addition to theoretical and computer simula-
tion results, hardware experiments are performed to
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FIGURE 1. The transmitter structure of OFDM-IM [3].
validate the realistic performance of the secure
OFDM-IM scheme by using an Universal Software
Radio Peripheral (USRP) hardware platform.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents a background of conventional OFDM-IM
and presents a system model for the proposed
secure OFDM-IM. We conduct a theoretical analysis
for reliability and security of the secure OFDM-IM in
Section III and IV. In Section V, we design a bit-mismatch
based set of mapping rules for secure DSM. The simulation
results to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme
are presented in Section VI. Finally, concluding remarks are
given in Section VII.
Notation: Upper-case and lower-case boldface letters are
used formatrices and vectors, respectively. The superscripts T
andH represent the transpose andHermitian of a randomvari-
able, respectively. Denote by I the identitymatrix. CN (µ, σ 2)
represents the distribution of circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian (CSCG) with mean µ and variance σ 2. E[·] is the
statistical expectation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. OFDM-IM
Suppose that a legitimate transmitter, called Alice, sends
conﬁdential signals to a legitimate receiver, called Bob, while
there exists an eavesdropper, called Eve, in a multicarrier
system. In every transmission fromAlice to Bob, we consider
OFDM-IM system, where N subcarriers are divided into
g clusters [3].
Each cluster has n subcarriers so that N = ng, which is
also the size of fast Fourier transform (FFT) for OFDM-IM.
Unlike conventional OFDM, not all the subcarriers are used
for transmission in OFDM-IM, where only k out of n subcar-
riers are active per cluster, where k ≤ n. The combination
of the active subcarriers is referred to as IM symbol and the
number of possible IM symbols per cluster is C(n, k) = (n
k
)
.
Thus, the number of bits to be transmitted by IM per cluster
is B1 = ⌊log2 C(n, k)⌋. The set of k active subcarrier indices
in the β-th cluster for β = 0, 1, · · · , g− 1 is given by
Iβ = {iβ,0, · · · , iβ,k−1}, (1)
where iβ,u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} for u = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1.
Once the active subcarriers are selected, B2 = k log2M
bits can be conveyed byM -ary modulation, which is referred
to as DSM, on the k active subcarriers. The set of k M -ary
symbols in the β-th cluster is given by
Sβ = {sβ,0, · · · , sβ,k−1}, (2)
where sβ,u ∈ S . Here, S represents the constellation ofM -ary
signals. Thus, B1 + B2 bits are transmitted per cluster.
Denote by xF = [xT0 , · · · , xTg−1]T the OFDM symbol
vector in OFDM-IM, where xβ = [xβ (0), · · · , xβ (n − 1)]T
represents the transmitted symbol vector of the β-th cluster
that xβ (iβ,u−1) ∈ S for iβ,u ∈ Iβ , otherwise xβ (iβ,u−1) = 0.
For convenience denote by K = kg the total number
of active subcarriers. In Fig. 1, an transmitter structure of
OFDM-IM is illustrated.
The OFDM-IM signal in the frequency domain is trans-
formed into the time domain for transmissions as follows:
xT =
1√
K
FHNxF , (3)
where FHN denotes the discrete Fourier transform (DFT)
matrix and E[xHT xT ] = N under the assumption that
E[|sβ,u|2] = 1 for all β and u. Then, a cyclic preﬁx (CP) of
lengthNcp, which is xT ,CP = [xT (N−Ncp+1), · · · , xT (N )]T ,
is appended at the beginning of xT . Note that the CP length,
denoted byNcp, has to be longer than the length of the channel
impulse response (CIR), denoted by ν, to avoid the inter-
block interference [12], [37].
After deleting CP and performing FFT, the received signals
in the frequency domain at Bob and Eve, respectively, are
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given by
yb = HxF + nb, (4)
ye = GxF + ne, (5)
where nb ∼ CN (0, N˜0I) and ne ∼ CN (0, N˜0I) are indepen-
dent background noise terms at Bob and Eve, respectively, in
the frequency domain. Here, N˜0 represents the noise spectral
density (in the frequency domain). In addition, the diagonal
frequency domain channel matrices of Bob and Eve, respec-
tively, are given by
H = diag(H (0),H (1), · · · ,H (N − 1)) (6)
and
G = diag(G(0),G(1), · · · ,G(N − 1)), (7)
where H (i) and G(i) are the channel coefﬁcients of the
i-th subcarrier in the frequency domain at Bob and Eve,
respectively, which can be represented as follows:
H (i) =
ν−1∑
q=0
hqe
−j2π qiN ,
G(i) =
ν−1∑
q=0
gqe
−j2π qiN . (8)
Here, hq ∼ CN (0, σ
2
H
ν
) and gq ∼ CN (0, σ
2
G
ν
) are the CIRs at
Bob and Eve, respectively, as in [3]. In this case, the channels
are multipath Rayleigh fading channels.
B. SECURE OFDM-IM
In this subsection, we ﬁrst introduce an existing secure
OFDM scheme in [29] that exploits the randomness of chan-
nels, and then propose a novel approach for secure transmis-
sions in OFDM-IM to compare the secure OFDM-IM with
the existing secure OFDM.
In OFDM, the randomness of wireless multipath channels
can be exploited for secure transmissions in the physical
layer. For example, a dynamic subcarrier interleaving scheme
is proposed for secure OFDM by taking advantage of the
channel reciprocity in [29]. In this approach, at Alice,P out of
the N subcarriers of an OFDM signal are selected and inter-
leaved after the symbol modulation. Here, the selection of
P subcarriers and interleaving pattern are determined by the
CSI between Alice and Bob, which is assumed to be shared
between Alice and Bob based on the channel reciprocity in
TDD mode. The indicator of the subcarrier selection is given
by
I (i) =
{
1, i ∈ U
0, otherwise
, i = 0, · · · ,N − 1, (9)
where U denotes the set of indices of subcarriers included
in the interleaving. Following the subcarrier selection, the
P selected subcarriers are interleaved in descending order of
their channel gains observed at the transmitter. The order of
the P subcarrier gains is renamed as follows:
[S˜(0), · · · , S˜(P− 1)]T, (10)
where S˜(p) for p = 0, · · · ,P − 1 becomes the p-th largest
|H (i)|2. Then, there is a one-to-one mapping between the
descending order of U and the descending order of channel
gains. For example, if P = 3, U = {3, 7, 9} and |H (7)|2 >
|H (9)|2 > |H (3)|2, the interleaved signals are x˜IF (3) = x˜F (7),
x˜IF (7) = x˜F (9), x˜IF (9) = x˜F (3), where x˜IF (i) is a transmitted
signal of the i-th subcarrier in the secure OFDM system and
the superscript I represents the interleaved symbols. Clearly,
Bob can detect the correct symbols by using the deinter-
leaving based on the CSI knowledge, while Eve could have
incorrect symbols due to unknown CSI to Eve.
In conventional OFDM-IM as in [3], B1 bits are mapped
onto the indices of k active subcarriers by a look-up table
or combinatorial method, while B2 bits are mapped onto
k symbols by a DSM mapping rule in each cluster. With
known mapping rules for IM and DSM, Eve can recover
IM bits and DSM bits using the ML detection for active
subcarrier indices and their symbols as Bob does [3].
In this case, it is clear that there is no guaranteed secrecy.
To overcome this problem, we employ the channel reciprocity
to secure OFDM-IM, similar to the SM approach in [34],
where the mapping rule for IM can be selected from a set
of different mapping rules depending on the CSI between
Bob and Alice. To this end, the CSI should change enough
to generate randomness of the CSI for secure IM and at
the same time the CSI should not quickly vary in order to
satisfy the channel reciprocity constraint (i.e., there exists
a trade-off). Then, in TDD, the channel reciprocity implies
that Alice and Bob have the same CSI which can be used
as a shared secret key for a randomized mapping rule in IM.
In [34], however, a randomized mapping rule is limited only
for IM, without taking into consideration DSM. Unlike [34],
we study opportunities to apply a randomized mapping rule
to DSM by using a characteristic of OFDM-IM. This forms
the main contribution of this work together with a design
of DSM mapping rules in order to increase the BER at
Eve. Furthermore, a successful attack probability that Eve
estimates secure mapping rules can be low by using the CSI
associated active subcarriers as a secret key for seucre DSM.
Consequently, we aim to transmit more secure bits than the
approach in [34] in the context of OFDM-IM. The resulting
scheme is called the secure OFDM-IM in this paper, which is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
As shown in Fig. 2, we assume that a block of N
subcarriers is divided into η subblocks of Wn subcarriers
(i.e., N = ηWn). One subblock includes W clusters and
each cluster has n subcarriers. For the secure OFDM-IM,
each cluster has individual mapping rule for secure IM, while
W clusters included in one subblock share the same mapping
rule for secure DSM. It means that there are η mapping rules
for secure DSM, while g mapping rules are used for secure
IM in the proposed secure OFDM-IM.
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FIGURE 2. The transmitter structure of the proposed secure OFDM-IM.
1) SECURE IM
There are two secrecy mapping parts in the proposed secure
OFDM-IM. In the ﬁrst part, similar to [34], we consider a
random mapping rule for IM. In a cluster, before selecting
the active subcarriers, Alice estimates |H (i)|2. Then she sorts
|H (i)|2 in descending order and renames them as follows:
[S(0), . . . , S(n− 1)]T , (11)
where S(l) for l = 0, · · · , n − 1 becomes the l-th largest
|H (i)|2, i.e., S(0) ≥ · · · ≥ S(n − 1), and l is the index
of S(l) not H (i). There is a one-to-one mapping between
{|H (i)|2} and {S(l)}. In the conventional OFDM-IM, a trivial
mapping rule is used. For example, if n = 4, k = 2,
the 0th and 2nd subcarriers are active, then non-zero sig-
nals are transmitted through the 0th and 2nd subcarriers. On
the other hand, in secure OFDM-IM, the mapping rule for
IM is related to {S(l)}. Thus, if S(0) = |H (3)|2, S(1) =
|H (2)|2, S(2) = |H (1)|2, S(3) = |H (0)|2, subcarrier 3 and
subcarrier 1 corresponding to S(0) and S(2), respectively, are
active. Since {S(l)} is unknown to Eve, she does not know the
mapping rule, leading to failed recovery of the IM bits.
2) SECURE DSM
The second secrecy part is to ensure secrecy of DSM, which
is not considered in [34]. For secure DSM, we also use a
randomized mapping rule based on the CSI associated with
the active subcarrier indices. A mapping rule for secure DSM
in one subblock is determined by channel gains associated
with κ = Wk active subcarriers in one subblock. For example,
if W = 1, the number of active subcarriers in each subblock
is given by κ = k . In this case, the possible number of secret
keys for secure DSMmay be small with a few k . The order of
κ channel gains corresponds to the randomized mapping rule
in the set of mapping rules. For example, if κ = 2 andM = 2,
a mapping rule for secure DSM is selected in accordance with
the order of channel gains associated with active subcarrier
indices as follows:
{|H (ι1)|2 ≤ |H (ι2)|2} → {M1 : [0] →−1, [1] → 1},
{|H (ι2)|2 ≤ |H (ι1)|2} → {M2 : [0] → 1, [1] →−1},
where ι1 and ι2 are active subcarrier indices in a subblock.
To obtain better security performance in terms of BER at
Eve, we design a set of mapping rules. For example, consider
a set of mapping rules with 4-QAM. In 4-QAM, there exist
4! = 24 possible mapping rules. Suppose that Alice uses a
certain mapping rule for 4-QAM as follows: {M : [00] →
1 + j, [01] → −1 + j, [10] → 1 − j, [11] → −1 − j}
and the transmitted symbols are perfectly detected at Eve.
If Eve chooses the following mapping rule: {M′ : [00] →
−1 − j, [01] → 1 − j, [10] → −1 + j, [11] → 1 + j},
the BER becomes 12 although the transmitted symbols are
correctly recovered. Thus, depending on Eve’s selection of
the DSM mapping rule, the BER varies and is usually high.
In Section V, we will investigate details on the mapping rule
for secure DSM.
III. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the BER at Bob is analyzed to evaluate the
reliability for the proposed scheme. For pragmatic systems,
we assume the presence of channel estimation errors.
The ML detection [38] is performed to jointly ﬁnd the
active subcarrier indices and DSM symbols of the active
subcarriers. The ML detection at Bob can be performed as
follows:
{iˆb, sˆb(i)} = arg min
ib∈I, sb(i)∈S
‖yb −HxF‖2, (12)
where I and S denote the sets of indices and the constella-
tions, respectively.
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Since the detection of the both IM and DSM bits depends
on the shared CSI between Alice and Bob, the CSI certainty
plays an important role in the proposed scheme. Particularly,
the use of CSI ensures to randomize the look-up table for
secure IM and DSM. Unlike the conventional OFDM-IM [3],
thus, bit errors are induced by not only ML detection errors
but also incorrect mapping rules caused by imperfect CSI.
The BER can be given by
PBe = 1− (1− PB1e )(1− PB2e ), (13)
where PB1e and P
B2
e are the bit error probabilities caused by
ML detection errors and incorrect selection of mapping rules,
respectively.
A. BER AT BOB WITH PERFECT CSI
If the channel is perfectly estimated at Alice and Bob, there
are no errors induced by the selection of incorrect IM and
DSM mapping rules at Bob (i.e., PB2e = 0). Then, from (13),
PBe is determined solely by P
B1
e . To compute P
B1
e , notice that
fromH in (6), the length of the CIR determines the correlation
of the channel coefﬁcients matrix as follows:
K = E[hhH] = FHN I˜FN , (14)
where h is a diagonal vector ofH and I˜ = [σ
2
H
ν
Iν×ν 0ν×(N−ν);
0(N−ν)×ν 0(N−ν)×(N−ν)]. K depends on the characteristics of
the channel (e.g., the length of CIR). If the length of CIR
is N , K becomes σ 2H IN , i.e., the correlation of {H (i)} is zero.
Otherwise, the H (i)s are correlated.
The received signal for the β-th cluster at Bob is given by
yβ = Hβxβ + nβ , (15)
where xβ and Hβ represents the transmitted signal vector
and channel coefﬁcients matrix corresponding to the β-th
cluster, respectively. Let hβ represent the vector containing
the diagonal elements of Hβ . Then, Kn = E[hβhHβ ] is the
β-th submatrix of centered along the main diagonal of the
matrixK in (14). As shown in [3], the BER for each cluster is
the same as that of OFDM-IM. Then, the unconditional pair-
wise error probability (UPEP) for the β-th cluster is given by
P
(
xβ → xˆβ
) ≈ 1/12
det(In + q1KnA)
+ 1/4
det(In + q2KnA)
,
(16)
where q1 = 14N˜0 , q2 =
1
3N˜0
, and A = (xβ − xˆβ)H (xβ − xˆβ).
Thus, from (13) and (16), the average BER of the
ML detection [3] is given by
PB1e ≈
1
Bnxβ
∑
xβ
∑
xˆβ
P
(
xβ → xˆβ
)
e
(
xβ , xˆβ
)
, (17)
where nxβ is the number of possible realizations of xβ and
e
(
xβ , xˆβ
)
is the number of error bits for the corresponding
pairwise error event.
B. BER AT BOB WITH IMPERFECT CSI
Notice that in practice, it is difﬁcult to share identical CSI
between Bob and Alice due to channel estimation errors
caused by noise, interference and imperfect hardware at each
side. From this, it is necessary to take into account imperfect
CSI in deriving BER. To this end, the uncertain channel
matrices at Alice and Bob, respectively, can be modeled as
follows:
HˆT = H+1HT ,
HˆR = H+1HR, (18)
where1HT = diag(1HT (0), · · · ,1HT (N−1)) and1HR =
diag(1HR(0), · · · ,1HR(N − 1)) are the diagonal estima-
tion error matrices at Alice and Bob, respectively. Here, we
assume that 1HT (i) ∼ CN (0, σ 2T ) and 1HR(i) ∼ CN (0, σ 2R)
for i = 0, · · · ,N − 1 [29].
First, derive PB1e with channel estimation errors in order
to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme under a
practical scenario. As shown in [3], the upper bound on the
UPEP with channel estimation errors is given by
P
(
xβ → xˆβ
) ≤ 1/12
det(In + q˜1K˜nA)
+ 1/4
det(In + q˜2K˜nA)
,
(19)
where q˜1 = 14N˜0+4σ 2R , q˜2 =
1
3N˜0+3σ 2R
and K˜n = Kn + σ 2RIn.
Then, using (17) and (19), the upper bound on the BER of
ML detection can be found.
Secondly, consider the derivation of PB2e , which is the
BER due to mismatched mapping rules with channel estima-
tion errors. To square mapping rules at Alice with mapping
rules at Bob, the order of estimated channel gains at Alice
should be the same as that of Bob. The orders of channel gains
at Alice and Bob, respectively can be expressed as
|HˆT (ιT ,0)|2 ≥ |HˆT (ιT ,1)|2 ≥ · · · ≥ |HˆT (ιT ,N−1)|2 (20)
and
|HˆR(ιR,0)|2 ≥ |HˆR(ιR,1)|2 ≥ · · · ≥ |HˆR(ιR,N−1)|2. (21)
If ιT ,l = ιR,l for l = 0, 1, · · · ,N − 1, Alice and Bob can
use the same mapping rules for IM and DSM. To obtain the
probability that Bob has the same order of the channel gains
as that of Alice, the correlation between the estimated CSI at
Alice and Bob is to be taken into account. Thus, we write the
estimated channel matrix at Bob as follows:
HˆR = HˆT +1HTR, (22)
where1HTR = 1HR−1HT is the error matrix between the
estimated channel matrices at Alice and Bob. Here,1HTR is a
diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements follow a zero mean
CSCG distribution with variance σ 2T + σ 2R (i.e., 1HTR(i) ∼
CN (0, σ 2TR) for i = 0, 1, · · · ,N − 1).
For simplicity, it is assumed that σ 2T = σ 2R , σ 2TR = σ 2T +σ 2R
and Q = σ
2
TR
N˜0
[39]. Then, as mentioned in [29], the estimated
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channel gain at Bob follows a noncentral chi-square distri-
bution with 2 degrees of freedom. Let λˆR,i = |HˆR(i)|2 be
the estimated channel gain of subcarrier i at Bob. Then, for
a given estimated channel matrix at Alice, the conditional
probability density function of the estimated channel gain at
Bob is given by
fR,i(λˆR,i
∣∣|HˆT (i)|2) = 1
σ 2TR
e
−
(
|HˆT (i)|2+λˆR,i
σ2
TR
)
I0
(
ϒ(λˆR,i)
)
,
(23)
where ϒ(λˆR,i) =
√
λˆR,i|HˆT (i)|2
2σ 2TR
and I0(x) =
∑∞
k=0
(x/2)2k
k!Ŵ(k+1) is
the modiﬁed Bessel function of the ﬁrst kind. The conditional
cumulative distribution function is also given by
FR,i(λˆR,i) = 1− Q1

√2|HˆT (i)|
σTR
,
√
2λˆR,i
σTR

, (24)
where Qθ (a, b) is the Marcum Q-function.
Let 8T (D) and 8R(D) denote a random event for certain
orders of D channel gains at Alice and Bob, respectively.
Then, from [29], the probability that Bob has the same map-
ping rules as Alice based on HˆR is given by
P(8R(D)|8T (D)) =
P(8R(D) ∩8T (D))
P(8T (D))
. (25)
For tractable analysis, it is assumed that all channel gains
are independent. Then, P(8T (D)) = 1D! . As in [29], the
probability of the events that the orders of the channel gains
at Alice and Bob are the same can be given by
P(8R(D) ∩8T (D)) =
∫ ∞
−∞
· · ·
∫ ∞
λˆT ,D−2
f (λˆT ,0) · · · f (λˆT ,D−1)
{
∫ ∞
−∞
fR,0(λˆR,0)d λˆR,0 · · ·∫ ∞
λˆR,D−2
fR,D−1(λˆR,D−1)d λˆR,D−1}
d λˆT ,0d λˆT ,1 · · · d λˆT ,D−1, (26)
where λˆT ,i = |HˆT (i)|2 is the i-th estimated channel gain at
Alice and follows an exponential distribution with parameter
σ 2
HˆT
= σ 2H + σ 2T . However, it is difﬁcult to obtain a closed-
form of the probability due to Bessel function. Instead, the
probability can be obtained by using numerical integrations or
Monte Carlo simulations. The numbers of the channel gains
used for secure IM in a cluster and DSM in a subblock are n
and κ , respectively. Then, the probabilities of the events that
orders of the channel gains at Alice and Bob for secure IM
and DSM, respectively, are the same can be given by PIM =
P(8R(n)|8T (n)) and PDSM = P(8R(κ)|8T (κ)). Finally, the
BER induced by mismatched mapping rules is given by
PB2e =
B1
B
(1− PIM )eIM +
B2
B
(1− PDSM )eDSM , (27)
where eIM and eDSM are the average BERs for IM and DSM,
respectively, when Bob selects different mapping rules from
those of Alice for IM and DSM with the estimated CSI.
Finally, the upper bound on the BER at Bob with imperfect
CSI can be obtained by applying (17) and (27) to (13).
Here, PB1e is sensitive to the SNR and channel estimation
errors, while PB2e can be largely inﬂuenced by the number
of active subcarriers and the channel estimation errors. More
importantly,PB2e or eDSM depends on the set of mapping rules,
which is also true for Eve. Thus, it might be possible to design
the set of mapping rules for more secure transmissions, which
is studied in Section V.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the BER at Eve and a successful attack prob-
ability that Eve estimates the secure mapping rules in the
proposed scheme, respectively, are analyzed to evaluate the
security for the proposed scheme.
A. BIT ERROR RATE AT EVE FOR SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, for tractable analysis, we assume that for
high SNR, the BER at Eve is computed as a security metric.
Note that this is a quite favorable assumption for Eve. For
high SNR, Eve is able to detect active subcarriers and their
symbols with a high probability by the ML detection as
follows:
{iˆe, sˆe(i)} = arg min
ie∈I, se(i)∈S
‖ye −GxF‖2. (28)
However, since the mapping rules for IM and DSM are not
known to Eve, Eve has to choose certain mapping rules at
random, which lead to incorrect decisions and a high BER.
1) BER OF SECURE IM
Unlike Bob, even though Eve can correctly detect the indices
of active subcarriers and transmitted symbols thanks to a
high SNR, Eve cannot correctly recover bits as the IM map-
ping rule is unknown. Suppose that the channels for Bob
and Eve are perfectly independent. Denote by PE1e the error
probability of IM bits at Eve. Based on the analysis in [34], it
can be shown that PE1e = 0.5. It is noteworthy that unlike
the approach in [34], we have secure DSM through active
subcarriers. In the next subsection, we study the security of
secure DSM in terms of BER.
2) BER OF SECURE DSM
GivenM -ary constellation, we can haveM ! possible different
mapping rules for secure DSM. In addition, since the order
of the channel power gains is used as a secret key, there
are κ! possible keys in each subblock. Let L denote the num-
ber of symbol mapping rules used for secure DSM. Suppose
that Eve knows the set of mapping rules for secure DSM by
analyzing the received signals. For example, if Eve performs
known plaintext attacks [40], she can easily estimate the set
of mapping rules. It is a favorable assumption to Eve. For a
given Eve’s mapping rule, the BER for the DSM bits at Eve
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is simply given by
PE2e =
L∑
m=1
pmP
E2
em
, (29)
where pm = 1L is the probability1 that the m-th mapping rule
is selected for DSM among L mapping rules, PE2em = 1log2M ρ
m
e
is the conditional BER on the m-th mapping rule use, and
ρme is the mean value of the number of mismatched bits per
symbol between the m-th mapping rule and the mapping rule
selected by Eve.
From (29), we can see that the BER at Eve is determined
by the average number of mismatched bits. As the number
of mismatched bits between the true mapping rule and the
mapping rule selected by Eve increases, the BER at Eve
should increase.
Denote by 3 the bit-mismatch matrix for a set of map-
ping rules, whose element is the number of mismatched bits
between the m-th mapping rule and the p-th mapping rule
which is denoted by 3m,p for m, p = 1, 2, · · · ,L. Here,
3m,m = 0 and 3m,p = 3p,m. Then, we can represent the
BER of DSM bits at Eve for a given set of mapping rules as
follows:
PE2e =
1
L2 log2M
L∑
m=1
L∑
p=1
3m,p. (30)
In (30), to obtain a high BER at Eve, we have to ﬁnd the set
of DSM mapping rules that have large 3m,p for m 6= p.
In summary, from the analysis, we ﬁnd the average BER
for both IM and DSM bits at Eve as follows:
PEe =
(
B1
B1 + B2
)
PE1e +
(
B2
B1 + B2
)
PE2e , (31)
where PE1e and P
E2
e are the BERs for the IM bits and the DSM
bits, respectively. The BER of IM bits at Eve can converge
to 0.5 under the independent channel scenario. However, the
BER of DSM bits at Eve depends on the set of mapping rules
which determines the values of 3m,p. Thus, it is important
to design a set of mapping rules for secure DSM which is
discussed in Section V.
B. SUCCESSFUL ATTACK PROBABILITY FOR
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we analyze the successful attack prob-
ability that Eve estimates the secure mapping rules in the
proposed OFDM-IM.
As mentioned earlier, although Eve can obtain correct
indices and symbols by using ML detection with high com-
puting power in the secure OFDM-IM, Eve cannot recover
IM and DSM bits without secure mapping rules. So, Eve
can attempt to perform attacks that Eve estimates the secure
mapping rules. If the IM and DSM bits are unknown to
1We assume that Eve knows the set of mapping rules, but does not know
which one is used for the DSM of a given subblock. Thus, we assume that
Eve chooses one randomly and uniformly among L mapping rules.
Eve, the probabilities that Eve chooses the mapping rules
for secure IM in one cluster and for secure DSM in one
subblock, respectively, are given by 1
2B1
and 1
L
. For example,
ifN = 128, n = 4, η = 16, L = 2 andB1 = 2, the successful
attack probability is given by PS,A =
(
1
2B1
)N
n ×
(
1
L
)η
≈
8 × 10−25. It is negligibly small. However, if Eve knows
the transmitted IM and DSM bits, Eve can perform known
plaintext attacks whichmake the successful attack probability
high. In particular, if IM bits are known to Eve, the mapping
rule for secure IM can easily be estimated by Eve.
On the other hand, the proposed secure DSM can protect
the attacks by exploiting a characteristic of OFDM-IM which
uses a fraction of subcarriers for transmissions. Due to the
change of active subcarrier indices, the mapping rules for
secure DSM which are determined by the CSI of the active
subcarriers can change for the coherence time. As mentioned
earlier, if the CSI quickly changes with short coherence time,
it can frequently update a secret key that it makes Eve’s
attacks difﬁcult, while the channel reciprocity constraint
may invalid with short coherence time. The proposed secure
DSM scheme can make the CSI used as a secret key change
dynamically for coherence time because the secret key is
associated with the CSI of multiple active subcarriers that
change in accordance with IM bit stream. This leads us
to improve the above trade-off and makes the Eve’s attack
difﬁcult.
To perform the successful attack in the proposed secure
OFDM-IM, Eve has to estimate the secure mapping rules for
all secret key changes which are determined with the active
subcarrier indices in the proposed secure OFDM-IM. Then,
for tractable analysis, we assume that the active subcarrier
indices in one subblock are disjoint (i.e., there are disjoint
2WB1 indices). It means that the possible number of secret key
regeneration for the coherence time is 2WB1 . In addition, Eve
may need at least ⌈M−1
κ
⌉ disjoint constellations to estimate
the mapping rule for secure DSM in one subblock. Thus,
for a secure DSM mapping rule in one subblock, at least
⌈M−1
κ
⌉2WB1 observations are required for the Eve’s attack.
On the other hand, if the secure DSM is applied to OFDM
systemswith ηmapping rules for secure DSM, at least ⌈M−1
Wn
⌉
observations (i.e., only ⌈M−1
Wn
⌉ disjoint constellations) are
required for the Eve’s attack.
The average data symbol error probability [41] of classical
M -ary PSK under perfect CSI is approximated by
PM ≈
ς
12

 1
1+ nEsρ
kN˜0
+ 3
1+ 4nEsρ
3kN˜0

, (32)
where ρ = sin2( π
M
), ς = 1, 2 for M = 2 and M > 2,
respectively, and Es is symbol energy. In this paper, we
assume Es = 1. Then, as shown in [41], an index error
probability and a data symbol error probability at Eve caused
byML detection errors in the proposed secure OFDM-IM are
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approximated as follows:
PI ≈
ϕ
12
{[
1+ nEs
4kN˜0
]−2
+ 3
[
1+ nEs
3kN˜0
]−2}
(33)
and
PD =
(
1− 1
M
)
PI + PM − PIPM , (34)
where ϕ = k(n − k). Then, the probability that Eve detects
incorrect indices or data symbols in each cluster is approxi-
mated by
PS ≈ 1− (1− PI )(1− PD)k . (35)
From (35), the probability that Eve estimates a secure DSM
mapping rule for each subblock with ⌈M−1
κ
⌉2WB1 observa-
tions is approximated by
PA ≈ (1− PS)W ⌈
M−1
κ
⌉2WB1 . (36)
The independent η(= N
Wn
) mapping rules are used for secure
DSM in the proposed secure OFDM-IM. Then, from (36),
the successful attack probability for all subblocks is approx-
imated by
PS,A ≈ (1− PS)
N⌈M−1κ ⌉
n 2
WB1
. (37)
From (37), we can ﬁnd that the successful attack probability
can signiﬁcantly decrease with a large
N⌈M−1
κ
⌉
n
2WB1 . From
this, although the modulation order is small (e.g.,M = 2, 4),
we can obtain low successful attack probability with largeW
(or B1). However, note that from (27), the BER at Bob
can be high with a large W due to channel estima-
tion errors. Therefore, to make the Eve’s attack difﬁcult
with reasonable reliability, it is desirable to have large N
and B1.
V. BIT-MISMATCH BASED SET OF MAPPING RULES FOR
SECURE DSM SCHEME
In this section, we focus on developing a set of DSMmapping
rules. In particular, to maximize the security performance,
we intend to maximize the BER at Eve, and the performance
criterion for the randomized DSM is derived in this section.
We develop a bit-mismatch based set and a random-selection
based set of mapping rules for secure DSM. Particularly, the
bit-mismatch based set is designed to maximize the perfor-
mance criterion and compared with the random-selection2
based set.
2The performance of the random-selection based set will provide an
average performance that can be achieved without any optimal design of
the set of mapping rules for secure DSM. Thus, the performance of the
random-selection based set can be used as a baseline performance to see the
performance improvement by the bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules.
A. BIT-MISMATCH BASED SET
From (30), to obtain a high BER at Eve, we have to
ﬁnd the set of DSM mapping rules that have large 3m,p
for m 6= p. To this end, the mean of the elements, which is
given by
ξ = 1
L2
L∑
m=1
L∑
p=1
3m,p, (38)
is employed as the performance criterion for secure DSM in
this subsection.
In the bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules, we choose
the L best DSM mapping rules that maximize ξ among
all possible M ! DSM mapping rules. Let 9 denote the
bit-mismatch matrix for all possible mapping rules whose
element is the number of mismatched bits per symbol denoted
by ψs,q for s, q = 1, 2, · · · ,M !. Let A denote the set of
possible numbers of the mismatched bits between two dif-
ferent mapping rules. Then, the set of possible numbers of
mismatched bits between two different mapping rules is given
by
A =
{ 2
M
, · · · , log2M
}
. (39)
Clearly, ψs,p ∈ A for s 6= p. The cardinality of the set for
the possible number of mismatched bits is given by |A| =
M
2 log2M . From (39), 3m,p ≤ log2M and 3m,p + 3m,a +
3a,p ≤ 2 log2M for a = 1, · · · ,L due to the symmetric
relationship between mapping rules. Then, the sum of the
elements in the m-th row and the p-th column in 3 can be
bounded as follows:
2m,p =
L∑
a=1
3m,a +
L∑
b=1
3b,p ≤ L log2M . (40)
In (40), when 3m,p = log2M , 3m,a + 3a,p = log2M
due to the symmetric property of mapping rules. Then, if
3m,p = log2M , 2m,p = L log2M can be maximized. From
this, we design the bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules
whose each mapping rule has the complementary mapping
rule in the set.
Let M◦m denote the complementary mapping rule of the
m-th mapping rule which has the largest mismatched bits
(i.e., log2M ) with the m-th mapping rule amongM ! possible
mapping rules. For example, for 4-QAM, the m-th mapping
rule and its complementary mapping rule, respectively, are
given by Mm : [00] → 1 + j, [01] → −1 + j, [10] →
1 − j, [11] → −1 − j and M◦m : [00] → −1 − j,
[01] → 1 − j, [10] → −1 + j, [11] → 1 + j. Each
mapping rule among M ! possible mapping rules surely has
one complementary mapping rule among them. Then, if
L is an even number, there exist L2 pairs of mapping rules
in the bit-mismatch based set with L ≤ M !. On the other
hand, if L is an odd number, there exist L−12 pairs of map-
ping rules and one mapping rule without its the comple-
mentary mapping rule in the bit-mismatch based set. Then,
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the bit-mismatch based set of mapping rule can maximize ξ
as follows:
ξ = 1
2L2
L∑
m=1
2m,L−m+1
≤


log2M
2
if L = 2l
log2M
2
− log2M
2L2
if L = 2l + 1,
(41)
where the complementary mapping rule of the m-th mapping
rule is the (L − m + 1)-th mapping rule in the bit-mismatch
set. As shown in (41), if L is an odd number, there might be a
slight performance degradation due to one unpaired mapping
rule. However, if L is not small, the performance degradation
is negligible. Nevertheless, it is desirable to have an even L.
From (30) and (41), when the bit-mismatch based set of
mapping rules is used, the BER of DSM bits at Eve is given
by
P
E2
e,b =


1
2
if L = 2l
1
2
− 1
2L2
if L = 2l + 1.
(42)
Let us consider a simple example with 4-QAM, where
S = {±1±j}. If L = 4, there areC(4!, 4) sets for themapping
rules. Among them, a set of mapping rules which maximizes
the mean value of 3m,p is as follows:
M1 : [00]  1+ j, [01]  −1+ j, [10]
 1− j, [11]  −1− j,
M2 : [00]  −1+ j, [01]  1+ j, [10]
 −1− j, [11]  1− j,
M3 : [00]  1− j, [01]  −1− j, [10]
 1+ j, [11]  −1+ j,
M4 : [00]  −1− j, [01]  1− j, [10]
 −1+ j, [11]  1+ j,
where M3 = M◦2 and M4 = M◦1. Then, for this set of
mapping rules, the bit-mismatch matrix is given by
3 =


0 1 1 2
1 0 2 1
1 2 0 1
2 1 1 0

 (43)
with ξ = 1. From (30), we can obtain PE2e,b = 0.5. Thus,
although Eve can detect the transmitted symbols and know
the set of the selected mapping rules, the BER at Eve can
be high as she does not know which DSM mapping rule is
actually used by Alice.
B. RANDOM-SELECTION BASED SET
It is also possible to consider a set of mapping rules that are
randomly selected. This may provide an average performance
without any optimal design for the set of mapping rules for
TABLE 1. The number of mapping rules denoted by  for different
number of mismatched bits among all possible mapping rules,
when M = 4.
TABLE 2. The number of mapping rules denoted by  for different
number of mismatched bits among all possible mapping rules,
when M = 8.
secure DSM (e.g., the bit-mismatch based set). In the random-
selection based set of mapping rules, we randomly select L
mapping rules among all M ! possible DSM mapping rules
regardless of the number of mismatched bits. Thus, 3 is
random and we have to ﬁnd the mean of 3 for all different
mapping rules. Then, the mean of 3 is given by
E[3m,p] =
{
0, if m = p,
ω, otherwise.
(44)
To ﬁnd ω, we select a certain mapping rule and compute
the number of mismatched bits with all other mapping rules.
As mentioned earlier, 9 is considered to compute the num-
ber of mismatched bits for all possible mapping rules. For
example, for 4-QAM, A = {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}, as shown
in TABLE 1. Due to the symmetric property ofψs,q, the mean
of the number of mismatched bits is given by
E[ψs,q] =
log2M
2
. (45)
From (45), for given s,
∑M !
q=1 ψs,q = M ! log2M2 . Then, ω can
be found as
ω = 1
M ! − 1
∑
q6=s
ψs,q,
= M ! log2M
2(M ! − 1) , (46)
where
∑
q6=s ψs,q =
∑M !
q=1 ψs,q because of ψs,s = 0. Then,
from (44) and (46), the sum of all elements of E[3] becomes
L∑
m=1
L∑
p=1
E
[
3m,p
] = L(L − 1)M ! log2M
2(M ! − 1) . (47)
Thus, from (30), the BER at Eve with the random-selection
based set of mapping rules is given by
PE2e,r =
(L − 1)M !
2L(M ! − 1) . (48)
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For example, for 4-QAM, the BER at Eve with the random-
selection based mapping rules becomes PE2e,r = 12(L−1)23L .
On the other hand, if M , which is a power of 2, is high
(e.g., 8, 16 and so on), the BER at Eve can be represented
as follows:
PE2e,r =
1
2
− 1
2L
. (49)
From (48) and (49), it can be found that as the size of the
random-selection based set of mapping rules, L increases, the
BER at Eve increases. This implies that with the larger set of
DSM mapping rules, the better security for DSM Alice and
Bob can have. In addition, from (48), if L = M !, then it is
shown that PE2e,r = 0.5.
In summary, we design the bit-mismatch based set of
mapping rules for secure DSM which maximizes the per-
formance criterion, ξ . From (42) and (49), we can see that
the bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules can provide an
improved performance compared with the average perfor-
mance that can be obtained by the random-selection based
set of mapping rules.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results with two dif-
ferent channels: one is the channel where all the frequency-
domain channel coefﬁcients are independent and the other
is a more realistic one, where the frequency-domain chan-
nel coefﬁcients are correlated as the length of CIR, ν, is
shorter than the number of subcarriers, N . The former chan-
nel is ideal as the equivocation of the secret key from the
CSI between Alice and Bob can be maximized. In addi-
tion, we show experimental results obtained using a software
deﬁned radio (SDR) platform.
A. COMPUTER SIMULATION RESULTS
In this subsection, we present simulation results to see the
performance of the proposed secure OFDM-IM system in
terms of BER. For simulations, we assume that n = 4,
k = 2, N = 128, Ncp = ν + 6 and σ 2H = σ 2G = 1.
In addition, the SNR is deﬁned as follows: SNR = Eb
N0
, where
Eb = (N + Ncp)/m denotes the bit energy and N0 represents
the noise variance in the time domain, which is given by
N0 =
(
N
K
)
N˜0.
Fig. 3 shows the BER of DSM bits at Eve with respect
to SNR when W = 2 and L = 2. In this ﬁgure, as the
SNR increases, the BER of the conventional scheme in [34],
which only has secure IM, rapidly decreases, while the pro-
posed scheme can maintain a high BER at Eve regardless of
SNR because of the bit-mismatch between randomized map-
ping rule at Alice and an arbitrarily selected mapping rule at
Eve for the secureDSM.According to (48), if the channels are
independent, the BERs associated with the random-selection
based set of mapping rules for M = 4 and M = 8 converge
to 0.2609 and 0.25, respectively, as SNR → ∞. This can
be conﬁrmed by the simulation results in Fig. 3. In addition,
from (42), the BERs associated with the bit-mismatch based
FIGURE 3. BER of DSM bits at Eve for different SNR with perfect CSI,
where W = 2 and L = 2.
FIGURE 4. BER of DSM bits at Eve for different size of set of mapping
rules denoted by L with perfect CSI where W = 2, M = 4
and SNR = 30dB.
set of mapping rules are always 0.5 with L = 2. However, in
a practical case where ν = 10, as shown in the ﬁgure, slightly
lower BERs at Eve than theoretical results which are obtained
with independent channels can be obtained. This shows
that the channel correlation degrades the performance of
secure OFDM-IM.
In Fig. 4, we show the simulation results for the BERs of
DSM bits at Eve for different values of L when W = 2,
M = 4 and SNR = 30dB. To see the impact of L on
the BER, it is assumed that the channel coefﬁcients are
independent in this simulation. As the size of the set of
mapping rules, L, increases, the BER at Eve increases for the
random-selection based set of mapping rules. Furthermore,
for a smaller M , a higher BER at Eve can be obtained for a
ﬁxed L in the random-selection based set of mapping rules.
As shown in (48), if L = M !, the random-selection based
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FIGURE 5. BER of both IM bits and DSM bits at Bob and Eve for different
number of taps denoted by ν with perfect CSI, where W = 2, M = 4,
L = 2 and SNR = 20dB.
set results in a BER of 0.5 at Eve as explained in Section V.
But, L should be less than or equal to the length of the secret
key, κ!. In the proposed OFDM-IM, the number of active
subcarriers in a subblock, κ , may be small. Thus, we may
have κ! < M !. In this case, the random-selection based set
does not allow us to achieve a high BER at Eve. On the
other hand, the bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules can
maintain a high BER (i.e., 0.5) when L is an even number
as shown in Fig. 4. Consequently, it is necessary to use
the proposed bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules for
secure OFDM-IM.
In Fig. 5, we display the BER of both IM bits and DSM
bits at Bob and Eve for different values of ν in order to see the
impact of the length of CIR, ν, on the secrecy in terms of the
BER at Eve when W = 2, M = 4, L = 2 and SNR = 20dB.
Particularly, the proposed scheme that uses the channels in the
frequency domain as a secret key is inﬂuenced by the length
of CIR in terms of security. In addition, as shown in [3], it
can also affect the reliability which is evaluated in terms of the
BER at Bob. Since the ordering pattern of the channel gains is
diversiﬁed with the independence of the channels, it increases
the probability that Eve chooses an incorrect mapping rule
in the proposed scheme. In OFDM-IM, the performance gap
caused by a low ν may be small because it only uses a subset
of subcarriers. In this ﬁgure, it can be found that as the length
of CIR increases, the BER at Eve slightly increases, while the
BER at Bob decreases, which demonstrates that a large ν is
desirable.
In Fig. 6, we show the simulation results for the BER of
both IM and DSM bits at Bob and Eve for various values of
SNR when perfect CSI is assumed with W = 2, M = 4,
ν = 10, P = 16 and L = 2. As shown in this ﬁgure,
the BER at Bob of the proposed scheme is slightly higher
than that of the conventional OFDM-IM because the set of
mapping rules in the proposed scheme cannot always use the
graymapping. In addition, the BER of the OFDM-IM scheme
is lower than or equal to that of the OFDM with the same
FIGURE 6. BER of both IM bits and DSM bits at Bob and Eve for different
SNR with perfect CSI, where W = 2, M = 4, ν = 10, P = 16 and L = 2.
spectral efﬁciency (1.7778 bits/s/Hz). However, the proposed
scheme has a signiﬁcant performance improvement in terms
of the BER at Eve while the conventional secure schemes
in [29] and [34] can have a relatively low BER at Eve.
Especially, the bit-mismatch based set which is designed to
maximize the bit mismatch in secure DSM has a remarkable
performance improvement in terms of the BER at Eve. In
detail, the BERs at Eve with the random-selection and the bit-
mismatch based sets converge to about 0.16 and 0.23 as SNR
→ ∞, respectively (which are lower than theoretical values
(0.34 and 0.5) from (31) due to the correlation of frequency
domain channel coefﬁcients). Consequently, we observe the
secure IM and DSM with perfect CSI has a better perfor-
mance than the conventional schemes [29] and [34] in terms
of security while maintaining almost the same reliability.
Fig. 7 shows the BER of both IM and DSM bits at Bob and
Eve with respect to SNR with imperfect CSI when W = 2,
M = 4, ν = 10, Q = 1/2, P = 16 and L = 2.
Under a practical channel estimation scenario, the proposed
scheme is evaluated in this simulation to see BER. In addi-
tion, we compare the BERs at Bob and Eve of the proposed
schemewith the secure OFDMapproach in [29]. In the secure
OFDM, both Alice and Bob select not only the indices of
the interleaved subcarriers but also the interleaved pattern
with imperfect CSI. Obviously, the BER at Bob increases
due to the channel estimation errors. Especially, the BER
at Bob of the secure OFDM is slightly lower than that at
Eve due to mismatched indices of interleaved subcarriers
and wrong interleaved patterns caused by channel estimation
errors. Similarly, the BER at Bob of the proposed scheme
also increases because of mismatched mapping rules due to
channel estimation errors. Meanwhile, the BER at Eve of
the proposed scheme is still higher than that of the secure
OFDM scheme in [29]. Thus, the proposed scheme has a
better performance than the secure OFDM scheme in terms
of security under practical channel estimation scenarios with
similar reliability.
24970 VOLUME 5, 2017
Y. Lee et al.: Secure Index and Data Symbol Modulation for OFDM-IM
FIGURE 7. BER of both IM bits and DSM bits at Bob and Eve for different
SNR with imperfect CSI, where W = 2, M = 4, ν = 10, Q = 1/2, P = 16 and
L = 2.
In Fig. 8, we show the impact of various parameters
(i.e., M , W and SNR) on the successful attack probability
when L = M !. In Fig. 8 (a), the probability that Eve
detects incorrect indices or data symbols in one cluster is
shown for various SNR. As shown in this ﬁgure, a high
modulation order and a low SNR make the probability high.
From (37), the probability signiﬁcantly inﬂuences to the
successful attack probability because Eve should detect the
correct indices and symbols to estimate secure mapping rules.
In Fig. 8 (b), we show the simulation results for the successful
attack probability for various SNR. We compare the success-
ful attack probability of the secure OFDM-IMwith that of the
secure OFDM with the secure DSM scheme. As mentioned
in subsection IV.B, at least ⌈M−1
κ
⌉2WB1 observations are
required for the Eve’s attack in the secure OFDM-IM, while
at least ⌈M−1
Wn
⌉ observations are required for the attack in the
secure OFDM. Due to the large number of observations, the
secure OFDM-IM can obtain a much lower successful attack
probability than that of the secure OFDM. Furthermore, in the
secure OFDM-IM, the successful attack probability can be
reduced with large W and M . In particular, as shown in this
ﬁgure, W has a signiﬁcant impact on the successful attack
probability. That is, although the modulation order is small
(e.g, M = 2), a large W results in a low successful attack
probability.
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this subsection, experimental results are provided to val-
idate the proposed secure OFDM-IM scheme by using the
USRP which is a SDR hardware platform. The USRP is a
ﬂexible and low cost platform developed by National Instru-
ments (NI). We have used two NI USRPs whose model is
the USRP-2943R and a vector signal analyzer (VSA) which
plays a role as a computer to control the USRPs, as shown in
Fig. 9. In addition, we use channel simulator which simulates
FIGURE 8. Performances for various values of SNR, where L = M!; (a) the
probability of incorrect indices or data symbols in one cluster; (b) the
probability of successful attack by Eve.
FIGURE 9. USRP experiment environment for the secure OFDM-IM.
outdoor channels from the USRP because an indoor channel
in our experimental environment which is similar to a ﬂat
channel (i.e., ν = 1 or 2) cannot be used as a secret key in
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FIGURE 10. Block diagram of the USRP experiment for the secure
OFDM-IM.
TABLE 3. Simulation parameters.
the secure OFDM-IM. In addition, we assume that channel
coefﬁcients which are generated by the channel simulator
are perfectly shared between Alice and Bob. As shown in
Fig. 10, USRP-A and USRP-B play roles as Alice and Bob
(or Eve), respectively. In experimental simulations, simula-
tion parameters are given in Table. 3.
In Figs. 11 and 12, the experimental results by using
the USRPs are shown to validate the proposed secure
OFDM-IM. Fig. 11 shows the BER of IM and DSM bits at
Bob and Eve with respect to a transmission power gain in the
FIGURE 11. BER of both IM bits and DSM bits at Bob and Eve for different
transmission power gain in the USRP experiment.
USRP-A when the bit-mismatch based set is used. As shown
in this ﬁgure, under the ideal channel condition (i.e., all the
channel coefﬁcients are independent) which are generated by
the channel simulator, the BER at Eve can be maximized
(i.e., 0.5) regardless of the transmission power gain. In addi-
tion, under the practical channel condition with ν = 10, as
the transmission power gain increases, the BER at Eve is kept
to about 0.2 regardless of the transmission power gain while
the BER at Bob decreases. Consequently, the experimental
results conﬁrm the validation of the secure OFDM-IM.
In Fig. 12, we depict the transmitted thermal infrared
image [42] whose size is 256 × 256 pixels from Alice and
recovered thermal infrared images at Bob and Eve, respec-
tively, when the transmission power gain is 4dB and ν = 10.
As mentioned earlier, the OFDM-IM can be suitable for
applications where transmitters and receivers have various
implementation constraints in terms of complexity. In the
simulation, we assume that the infrared sensor (Alice) which
is a small device with low complexity transmits an infrared
image to an access point (Bob) with the secure OFDM-IM
in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). From the ﬁgure,
we can ﬁnd that the recovered image at Bob is almost same
with that of Alice although the negligible noise exists. On the
FIGURE 12. Thermal infrared images at Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively, where the transmission power gain is 4dB.
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other hand, the recovered image at Eve is very noisy. In sum-
mary, we can see that under the thermal infrared transmis-
sion scenario, Bob can correctly detect the conﬁdential data
(i.e., the infrared image) from the received signal with the
secure OFDM-IM, while Eve obtains almost useless data
from the received signal.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed the secure IM and DSM for OFDM-IM
systems. Unlike the conventional scheme which only has
secure IM, the proposed scheme was able to protect
DSM bits as well as IM bits based on the randomized map-
ping rule with the use of the CSI between Alice and Bob.
Most remarkably, the CSI associated with active subcarri-
ers can be used as a secret key to enhance the security
of DSM in the proposed secure OFDM-IM. It makes the
Eve’s attack difﬁcult by changing the secret key for the
coherence time. In addition, to design a set of mapping
rules for secure DSM, we studied the random-selection based
set of mapping rules and the bit-mismatch based set of
mapping rules. In the bit-mismatch based set of mapping
rules, we proposed a performance criterion to choose the
mapping rules that can increase the BER at Eve. Eventu-
ally, it was ensured to make the BER at Eve the worst
(i.e., 0.5). From the analysis and simulation results, we have
shown that the proposed secure IM and DSM scheme for
OFDM-IM systems outperforms the conventional scheme in
terms of security.
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